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RESTRAINTS ON FREEDOM
OF THE PRESS
WALTER J. MATTISON*
T HE term "trial by newspapers" is probably as old as newspapers
themselves, but it is only during the past decade that that term
has come into general use in the United States.
Judging from the number of cases that have reached the highest
courts of the land, it is very evident that many of the publishers today
are firmly convinced that a trial by newspapers is an inalienable right
possessed by such newspapers, and in each action we find an attempted
justification on the grounds that the Federal Constitution guarantees
the freedom of the press. Nothing could be further from the facts.
The first amendment to the Constitution of the United States provides
that "Congress shall make no law . . . . abridging the freedom of
speech or of the press .... " This amendment is confined to laws
passed by Congress. There is nothing in this amendment nor the
Constitution itself that prohibits the various states from passing laws
restricting the right of newspapers to publish anything unless such
laws become repugnant to the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitu-
tion of the United States. Outside of this very limited restriction,
the states can legislate on the subject in any way each individual
state sees fit unless absolutely restricted or limited by the constitution
of the state affected.
We gather from this, in the first place, that the Federal Constitution
does not guarantee the freedoin of the press. Further, the constitutional
provision restraining Congress from making laws abridging the free-
dom of the press must likewise be construed in the light of other con-
stitutional provisions. Freedom of the press is a relative term, some-
what analogous to that of liberty. While we secure certain rights as
to liberty under the constitution, such liberty is subject to other re-
straints contained in the constitution, designed to safeguard the rights
and liberties of others. Congress therefore has the right to pass laws
which effectually restrain the freedom of the press where public nec-
essity requires such restraint.
*Assistant City Attorney, Milwaukee; Instructor Newspaper Law, Mar-
quette College of Journalism.
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It has been said by some authorities that the freedom of the press
clause in the constitution merely prohibits a prepublication censorship
of news; that a newspaper can publish what it pleases, being liable to
respond civilly or criminally after publication.
Even this, however, is not an exact statement of the law. The first
amendment does not prevent prepublication censorship, as witness the
effect of the war time acts where power given congress and the presi-
dent by the constitution was paramount to the fundamental guaranties
of liberty, including that of freedom of the press. Under the war
powers the Federal Congress and the president had the right to pro-
tect the country against attacks from within designed to aid the enemy,
and the exercise of such powers were upheld by the highest court of
the land.'
Another instance where prepublication restraint has been justified
is under the rather doubtful theory of "the right to privacy," which
has been rejected in many of the states of this country, but which has
likewise been regarded as a property right in other states. In the
states recognizing the theory that a person has a right to live his life
as he pleases, whether it be a life of complete privacy or of privacy as
to certain acts and publicity as to other acts, it is evident that an
injunction will lie to restrain any threatened invasion of such right to
privacy by newspapers. This restraint, however, is based upon the
constitutional guaranty which prevents invasion of property rights.
These limited restraints together with another class wherein publica-
tion amounts to a contempt of court, constitute, we believe, nearly
all of the prepublication restraints. The great mass of the law per-
taining to newspapers operates with the idea of punishment after publi-
cation. These laws are very effective restraints, and, broadly speaking,
can be classified under enactments passed pursuant to broad police
powers possessed by the federal and state government to protect public
safety and welfare, under those powers exercised solely by the federal
government in limiting the use of the mails, and under the broad in-
herent power of courts of record to punish for contempt of court.
Nearly every state has adopted constitutional provisions somewhat
similar to those included in the First Amendment to the Constitution
of the United States; but even under such constitutional restrictions
states have much broader powers to legislate on the subject than has
the federal government-this in view of the fact that the federal con-
stitution is a delegation of powers, whereas the state constitution merely
acts as a limitation. It has been' truthfully stated that as far as state
restraints are concerned the various legislatures have the right to pass
laws restraining the publication of almost anything, within reason of
course, as long as such enactments do not amount to a prepublication
censorship.
Thus we have a Connecticut law, which was sustained, prohibiting
the sale of any paper devoted wholly or principally to the publication
of criminal news or pictures and stories of deeds of bloodshed, lust
or crime (State v. McKee, 73 Conn. i8, 46 Atl. 409, page 413) and a
'Schenck v. U.S., 249 U.S., page 48, 63 L. ed. 47o, page 472; United States
of America ex rel Milwaukee Social Democratic Publishing Company v. Burleson,
255 U.S. 408, 65 L. ed. p. 707.
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Minnesota statute, which was likewise sustained, rendering it unlaw-
ful to publish in a newspaper the details of a public execution beyond
the statement of the fact that such convict was on the day in question
duly executed according to law.
All governments, both state and federal, have a right to punish
and prohibit publication of seditious utterances and under the police
powers have the right to prohibit any newspaper publication of articles
that are obscene and also articles which blaspheme, these prohibitions
being made necessary, of course, from the standpoint of public se-
curity as well as public safety.
In spite of the First Amendment, the Federal Congress has ad-
ministered what amounts to a very effectual restraint under its power
to control traffic between states and under its rights to regulate the
mail. Under its power to regulate. traffic between states it has legis-
lated to prevent interstate shipments of obscene matters and publica-
tions detrimental to morals or to the public welfare.
Under its power to regulate the mail Congress has passed a series
of very effective restraints. The so-called lottery statute is probably
the best known of all postal laws and regulations. Section 473 of the
Postal Laws and Regulations provides that "no newspaper, circular,
pamphlet or publication of any kind containing any advertisement of
any lottery, gift enterprise, or scheme of any kind offering prizes de-
pendent in whole or in part upon lot or chance, or containing any
list of the prizes drawn or awarded by means of any such lottery, gift
enterprise or scheme, whether said list contains any part or all of such
prizes, shall be deposited in or carried by the mails of the United States,
or be delivered by any postmaster or letter carrier."
Just what constitutes a lottery or a gift enterprise within the mean-
ing of this regulation has been a very fruitful source of litigation and
will continue to be so in the future. The federal government has
held that to publish the successful numbers of a drawing for the prize-
winning automobile at automobile shows, dances or other instances
where such prizes are given by.lot and dependent upon chance, consti-
tutes a lottery, and that the publication of these numbers constitutes
an offense against the postal regulation in question and in addition
to the punishment prescribed by the statute hold that such publication
is sufficient to close the mails to the offending newspaper.
The courts and the textbooks have variously defined what consti-
tutes a lottery or a gift enterprise as follows:
"A lottery is a species of gaming . . . . and is a scheme for
distribution of prizes by chance among persons who have paid,
or agreed to pay, a valuable consideration for the chance to obtain
a prize." 25 C2c. 1633.
"A scheme for distribution of prizes by chance."
"A scheme by which a result is reached by some action or means
taken, and in which result man's choice or will has not part, nor
can human reason, foresight, sagacity, or design enable him to
know or determine such result until the same has been accomp-
lished." People v. Elliott, 74 Mich. 264, 267; 41 N.W. 916.
"'Lottery' embraces the element of procuring through lot or
chance, by the investment of a sum of money or something of
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value, some greater amount or thing of greater value." U.S. v.
Wallis, 58 Fed. 942, 943.
"If the result of the distribution is to be determined solely by
skill or judgment, the scheme is not a lottery; but by the better
rule if the influence of skill is apt to be thwarted by chance it will
be immaterial that the conditions of distribution permit the exer-
cise of judgment to some extent." Lotteries, 25 Cyc. p. 1635.
"Offers of prizes to purchasers of goods, the prizes to be dis-
tributed by chance among the purchasers, constitute lotteries,
whether the goods purchased or the chance to obtain a prize is the
consideration that moves the purchasers to enter into the tran-
saction. And of similar nature is the distribution of prizes by
chance among purchasers of concert tickets." 25 Cyc. pp. 1637-8.
Gift enterprise defined.
"The transfer of rights of independent value in money or prop-
erty, together with the right, in the consideration of the pay-
ment of value, to a chance for a prize, may be called a gift
enterprise." Thomas Non-Mailable Matter 85.
The case of Post Publishing Company v. Murray, 230 Fed. Rep.
773, is of interest in view of the fact that the prize offered by that
newspaper was considered by the court as not being a violation of
the federal statute. The Boston Post advertized that its photographers
would take the pictures of woman shoppers and publish the pictures
with the heads cut off and that five dollars would be paid to each lady
photographed who identified her photo. The court held in this case
that the facts did not bring it within the statutes as the particular kind
of a chance involved did not require a parting with anything of value by
members of the public for the prize offered and it did not amount to a
lottery, as lottery involves a scheme for raising money by selling
chances to share in a distribution of prizes or a scheme for the distribu-
tion of prizes by chance among persons purchasing tickets, and a gift
enterprize contemplates a scheme in which presents are given as an
inducement to members of the public to part with their money. This
case did not go to the federal Supreme Court nor did an unreported
Iowa case go to the Supreme Court. In the Iowa case the court ar-
rived at a contrary decision in considering facts somewhat analogous
to those above stated. The court in the Iowa case held that the time
spent by the individual working on the solution of the problem and
walking or riding to the newspaper office constituted a thing of value,
namely, his time and labor, and that such being the fact, the postal
regulation was violated and the scheme branded as a lottery and a
gift enterprise.
Other restraints which have been passed by Congress in spite of
the constitutional amendment guaranteeing freedom of the press, some
of which can be classified as direct and others as indirect restraints,
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are those which prohibit the mails to newspapers unless every six
months such newspapers using the mails publish sworn statements
giving minute details of ownership and indebtedness of the paper,
together with information as to its net paid circulation, and a law
which requires all news items, whether in the editorial columns or
the news colums, to be marked "advertisement" if any consideration
whatever moves from the person benefited to the newspaper. The
purpose of these enactments is obvious. It is an attempt on the part
of Congress to make public all interests behind the newspaper so
that the reading public might ascertain for itself what influences,
money or otherwise, are back of the policy of the paper. In the liti-
gation which has already been fought through the courts, an attempt
was made to show that all of these postal regulations amount to pre-
publication censorship but the courts decided otherwise.
Next in importance to the restraints imposed by Congress on the
freedom of the press through its postal regulations is undoubtedly
that great inherent power possessed by the courts to punish for con-
tempt. No other power exercised by the court has been subjected
to such severe criticism. This is due largely to the fact that there
is a growing tendency on the part of newspapers to try out in the
public press criminal actions as well as public questions pending be-
fore courts. The power to punish for contempt is inherent in the
courts. It dates back to the common law, and it has always been held
that such power is vital in order to enable courts to perform their en-
tire duties to the public and to protect the right of litigants. The
power to punish for contempt is likewise possessed by courts and by
state legislatures. Neither Congress nor the legislature under the
separation of power doctrine could deprive courts of this inherent
right and the courts through the promiscuous use of the injunction,
cannot deprive the various legislative branches of the right to punish
for contempt.
In the anxiety of newspapers to discuss questions of great public
importance, public statements have been made, are being made and
in the future will be made, which prejudice the rights of parties in
pending litigation. This was discussed by Mr. Justice Holmes in the
case of Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U. S. 454, 51 L. ed. 879, wherein he
said:
A publication likely to reach the eyes of a jury, declaring a
witness in a pending cause a perjurer, would be none the less a
contempt that it was true. It would tend to obstruct the adminis-
tration of justice, because even a correct conclusion is not to be
reached or helped in that way, if our system of trials is to be
maintained. The theory of our system is that the conclusions to
be reached in a case will be induced only by evidence and argument
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in open court, and not by any outside influence; whether of private
talk or public print.
It must be self-evident from Justice Holmes' discussion that the
intent of the writer or newspaper is immaterial, and that the truth or
falsity of the statements is likewise immaterial. If the facts as set
up in the newspaper are brought to public attention, they are deemed
to be "calculated" to influence the decision and therefore tend to in-
terfere with the due administration of justice in pending actions. This,
of course, is based on sound logic. In adopting the procedure of the
court it was the intention of the people that litigation is to be determined
by regularly constituted bodies, on testimony to be presented under
circumstances, where the right to cross-examine witnesses is given liti-
gants, and where the court itself would supervise the orderly presenta-
tion of such testimony. This procedure is based on the experience of
all civilized countries extending over a period of hundreds of years,
and while it may have its faults nothing has ever been presented to
justify any departure from this orderly method of trying litigated
questions. To permit outside influence, even under the guise of free-
dom of the press, to disfort the facts, or comment, favorably or un-
favorably, upon them would defeat the very purpose for which courts
are established.
There are two different rules affecting punishments for contempt
in this country. The first is the common law rule wherein it is held
that to charge the court with unfairness or corruption amounts to a
contempt even after the termination of the case in question. The
other rule, which is the rule in Wisconsin and which constitutes the
weight of authority in state courts, is that criticism after the case is
ended is not contempt of court however malicious such contempt may
be. The federal courts adopted the latter theory and that is the rule
in the federal courts as shown by the decision in Patterson v. Colorado,
205, U. S. 454, 51 L. ed. 879, wherein the court said:
When a case is finished courts are subject to the same criticism
as other people; but the propriety and necessity of preventing in-
terference with the courts of justice by premature statement, argu-
ment or intimidation hardly can be denied.
In all jurisdictions there are two fundamental rules of law. First:
Newspapers may during the pendency of the case publish a fair and
truthful account of the proceedings; and second, in all jurisdictions the
newspaper must refrain from publishing other matter, whether news
or comment, which is calculated to prejudice the rights of either side,
discredit the court or influence its decision.
Contempts are punishable without a trial by jury. Newspaper con-
tempts are known as constructive contempts in that they take place
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outside of the court room and are not committed as a rule in the judge's
presence. They are also called indirect contempts. In the case of so-
called newspaper contempts the defendant is usually brought in on a
rule to show cause and informed of the allegations. A day is set for
a hearing and he is given a reasonable opportunity to prepare his de-
fense. The case is heard and he is acquitted or sentenced, depending
upon whether he is, found guilty or not of the contempt. These pro-
ceedings are not considered by the courts as criminal cases and for that
reason the case is heard without a jury. Cooley on Constitutional
Limitation, 4 Ed. 394. There could be no jury issue as a rule because
there is never any serious question as to the performance of the act,
and the only question involved is whether the newspaper comment con-
stitutes contempt of court or not.
In an appeal from the judgment of the court the appellate court
hears the action either on a writ of error, certiorari or habeas corpus
proceeding, and the only question before the appellate court is whether
the article was in fact contemptuous and did the court proceed legally.
A reading of the various cases indicates that while the punishment
of newspaper men for contempt is not infrequent, the punishments
imposed are usually very moderate. In a number of cases the court,
after imposing a fine, has indicated that a motion would be received
before the end of the term for a reduction in the fine upon the presen-
tation of evidence showing complete retraction by a publication by the
offending newspaper.
Contempt of court is a very important so-called restraint and while
courts have hesitated to cite newspapers for contempt of court, due
to the fact that these proceedings might be subject to considerable
criticism and misunderstanding, nevertheless in proper actions courts
have acted firmly to protect the court as an institution and the rights
of litigants'rightfully before the court.
Another line of action which might be classified as one of the in-
direct restraints on publication is the relief afforded citizens against
defamatory statements published in newspapers under the so-called libel
laws. The question of libel constitutes a great subdivision of the law
itself and any attempt to even briefly discuss the rights of newspapers
in libel actions would extend this article beyond all reasonable bounds,
and the subject therefore is merely mentioned as one of the restraints.
The purpose of this article is to call attention to the fact that the
freedom of the press is not an absolute right and that the term is
merely a relative term. We in this country do possess a freedom of the
press that is not the case in any other country in the world. While
the freedom of the press clause was not included in the original draft
of the Constitution, it was made the subject of the first constitutional
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amendment and its guaranty is primarily against prepublication censor-
ship such as prevailed in England and the American Colonies up to
the time of the American Revolution. Practically all of the states
have been very zealous in safeguarding the right of freedom of speech
and freedom of the press and no state has gone to the extent of pro-
hibiting any publication except under circumstances where the public
welfare, the public safety and public morals are directly involved. It
is an established doctrine in this country that the greatest amount of
freedom to the individual citizens of this county can only be fur-
thered by a free and untrammeled press, but in no jurisdiction have
newspapers been given the right under the guise of freedom of the
press to invade the constitutional guaranties that are given to the gen-
eral public under our form of government.
